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ABSTRACT
The impacts of long-lived stock pollutants and the abatement and technology measures
supposed to address them link current and future generations together. Altruism towards
successor generations is a prerequisite for resolving the resulting intergenerational equity
issues. Preference asymmetry and typical imperfections of altruism, however, introduce the
possibility of important strategic conficts between generations. We develop a simple model
highlighting the presence and nature of strategic distortions in addressing intergenerational
environmental problems. The current generation decides on a combination of abatement
and technology- enabling investment leading to an imperfect backstop technology. The
future generation decides whether to use the backstop or not. We identify three possible
outcomes: (1) Technology denial, in which the current generation deliberately rejects the
imperfect backstop in anticipation that the future generation will use the technology in an
undesired way. (2) Underabatement, in which the current generation provides the backstop
to the future generation but reduces abatement activities; and (3) Overabatement, in which
the current generation provides the backstop to the future generation but reduces abate-
ment activities. The outcome depends non-trivially on the environmental preferences of
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The impacts of long-lived stock pollutants and the abatement and technology measures
supposed to address them link current and future generations together. Altruism towards
successor generations is a prerequisite for resolving the resulting intergenerational equity issues.
Preference asymmetry and typical imperfections of altruism, however, introduce the possibility
of important strategic conflicts between generations. We develop a simple model highlighting
the presence and nature of strategic distortions in addressing intergenerational environmental
problems. The current generation decides on a combination of abatement and technology-
enabling investment leading to an imperfect backstop technology. The future generation decides
whether to use the backstop or not. We identify three possible outcomes: (1) Technology denial,
in which the current generation deliberately rejects the imperfect backstop in anticipation that
the future generation will use the technology in an undesired way. (2) Underabatement, in which
the current generation provides the backstop to the future generation but reduces abatement
activities; and (3) Overabatement, in which the current generation provides the backstop to
the future generation but reduces abatement activities. The outcome depends non-trivially on
the environmental preferences of the future generation. Uncertainty over future preferences
renders technology denial more likely.




Many environmental problems facing the world today involve long-lived stock pollutants. The long-
term persistence of these pollutants confronts today’s generation with policy challenges that have
a significant intergenerational equity dimension. Two responses to these challenges have received
most attention. One is the abatement of polluting activities by today’s generation, thus reducing the
stock of pollution passed on to the future. The other is the development of a technological backstop,
thus enabling future generations to manage more successfully the impacts of the stock pollution
problem generated by their predecessors. Both responses impose costs now and yield benefits only
in the future. For any of these activities to be undertaken, therefore, today’s generation needs to
exhibit a significant degree of altruism vis-à-vis its successors.
As the general economics literature reminds us, however, altruism offers no protection against
strategic conflicts between providers of altruistically motivated transfers and their recipients: The
‘rotten kid’ theorem (Becker 1974, Bergstrom 1989), the ‘Samaritan’s dilemma’ (Buchanan 1975),
and the ‘strategic bequest motive’ (Bernheim et al. 1985) are only the most prominent examples of
a wide literature on how preference asymmetries between donors and recipients can lead to ineffi-
ciencies due to strategic behavior (see Laferrere and Wolff 2006 for a survey). In addition, although
benevolent, altruism typically suffers from well-known imperfections. Prime among them is the
failure to accept consumer sovereignty of a recipient. Instead, donors attach merit connotations to
consumption or production bundles, giving rise to ‘paternalistic altruism’ (Bergstrom 1982, Pollak
1988, Jacobson et al. 2007). Therefore, while altruism is a prerequisite for resolving the inter-
generational equity issues concerning long-term environmental problems, preference asymmetries
between generations and imperfections of altruism jointly give rise to the possibility of important
strategic distortions.
This paper studies the presence and nature of strategic distortions that arise when a generation
decides the level of abatement and whether to provide a technological backstop to a successor gener-
ation. Both preference asymmetry and paternalistic altruism matter: Asymmetric preferences may
lead to the future generation failing to use the backstop as intended. Paternalistic altruism may lead
to the current generation reconsidering its abatement and technological transfer decision. Jointly,
both properties may lead to significant deviations from the combined abatement and technology
transfer that would be optimal if the strategic dimensions were absent.
To provide a tractable and instructive setting, we assume a society consisting of two non-
overlapping generations. Before the true marginal damage of pollution stock is revealed, the cur-
rent generation decides on a combination of abatement and technology-enabling investment (TEI)
leading to an imperfect backstop technology: While the backstop fully eliminates the damages by
the stock pollutant, it also causes other specific damages. The future generation, having learned the
true marginal damage, decides whether to use the technology. In this set-up, paternalistic altruism
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arises out of the combination of uncertainty over the true marginal damage at the time of decision
and the imperfection of the backstop: The current generation develops the backstop with the inten-
tion of it being used discriminately, i.e. only in the case of marginal damages being high. Preference
asymmetry, on the other hand, arises out of the difference in the valuation of the backstop-induced
damages: The successor generation could be more or less concerned than the current generation
about these damages. To make the analysis of the strategic considerations concrete, we envision a
welfare-maximizing outcome that involves a specific combination of abatement and the provision of
the backstop and to which the strategic distortions can be compared and contrasted. We provide a
specific illustration by drawing on the economic literature on so-called ‘geoengineering’ technologies
(Barrett 2008; Victor 2008; Schelling 1996). Referring to ‘deliberate large-scale interventions in the
climate system with the aim of reversing the effects of anthropogenic climate change’ (Keith 2000),
the climate change context conveniently captures the spirit of the stock pollution problem and the
damage uncertainty while the unintended side effects of geoengineering exemplify the imperfect
backstop.
Using this framework, we show that intergenerational transfers to resolve long-term environ-
mental problems can involve strategic distortions, leading to a rich set of possible outcomes, some
of them with troubling characteristics. The current generation may deliberately deny the imperfect
backstop in anticipation that the future generation will use the technology either indiscriminately
or not at all. The current generation may also decide that it is rational to accompany the de-
velopment of the backstop with a reduction in abatement efforts. This decision can arise for two
distinct reasons: One is that abatement becomes less productive because of an anticipation that
future generation will use the backstop regardless of the level of damages. The other reason is
that the backstop becomes more productive because the current generation strategically abates
less in anticipation of a successor generation not using the backstop regardless of the realization
of marginal damages: By decreasing abatement levels, the current generation can return its suc-
cessor to a discriminate use regime. The current generation may also decide that it is rational to
increase abatement levels in anticipation of the future generation using the backstop indiscrimi-
nately. With higher levels of abatement, the backstop becomes less productive and the successor
generation can be returned to a discriminate use regime. Increasing levels of uncertainty over the
future generation’s preferences have an asymmetric impact on the strategic equilibria: The sensi-
tivity of abatement levels of preference asymmetry decreases, but the sensitivity of the TEI decision
increases.
In terms of focus and results, this paper touches on three literatures: One is the general literature
on strategic conflicts between donors and recipients as covered above. While sharing the focus on
strategic distortions and time inconsistency with Lindbeck and Weibull (1988) and considering an
enlarged strategy space (Bergstrom 1989), the model developed here differs from this literature in
two respects. The first is the fact the transfers studied here are not inter vivos. As a result, the
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current generation’s strategy cannot involve transfers contingent on observable recipient behavior
(Bruce and Waldman 1991, Cremer and Pestieau 1996). The second aspect concerns the number
and types of intergenerational transfers. Not only does the model feature a combination of two
transfers (as opposed to one in the case of the ‘rotten kid theorem’; see Bergstrom 1989), but it
also introduces a novel type of transfer alongside transfers in-kind, namely a transfer of technology.
While transfers in-kind can limit the strategic distortions by restricting the choice set (Bruce and
Waldman 1991), technology transfer can be shown to have the opposite effect.
The second literature to which the paper relates studies the question of environmental preference
changes from generation to generation. There is a small set of recent papers that study from a
normative perspective how the presence of uncertainty over future preferences ought to impact on
optimal environmental policy today (Heal and Kriström 2002; Ayong Le Kama and Schubert 2004;
Krysiak and Krysiak 2006). While the present paper shares the concern for impacts on policy with
these papers, its positive spirit sets it apart from this literature and is more in line with strategic
focus spearheaded by Becker (1974). In doing so, it addresses a gap in environmental economics
where intergenerational conflict and strategic distortions have so far received little attention.
The third literature to which the paper is directly related studies the interface between tech-
nology and the environment. A number of recent papers (Goeschl and Perino 2009, 2007; Hart
2009) study the implications of technological change generating technologies that are environmen-
tally problematic. These papers adopt a normative position and therefore do not consider possible
strategic effects of an intergenerational type. The present paper differs in that two decision-makers
jointly determine whether the technology is deployed, and that the desirability of deployment de-
pends on external circumstances and preferences rather than being exogenously given. The present
paper also differs in the type of uncertainty considered: In contrast to Goeschl and Perino (2009)
and Hart (2009) that focus on technological uncertainty, and in addition to the preference asym-
metry considered in Krysiak and Krysiak (2006), the source of uncertainty in the present paper is
of a scientific nature (Newell and Pizer 2003).
We proceed as follows: First we introduce a simple model of a stock pollution problem with
abatement and intergenerational technology transfer, illustrating the general ideas in a climate
change setting. The model consists of a simple and concrete four-period sequence of abatement
choice, TEI choice, learning about climate sensitivity, and technology deployment. Section 3 deter-
mines a parameterization of the model in which strategic conflicts - like in Lindbeck and Weibull
(1988) - take the shape of a time inconsistency problem. This is followed by proofs of existence for
the strategic equilibria that arise instead. Section 4 completes the analysis with a full characteriza-
tion of the outcomes of the intergenerational game. Section 5 extends the analysis to uncertainty
over the future generation’s preferences and provides numerical illustrations. Section 6 provides a
concluding discussion and directions for future research.
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2 Abatement and intergenerational technology transfer - a
simple model
2.1 Model set-up
The following model provides a parsimonious setting that isolates the salient strategic implications
of the intergenerational decision problem. It consists of a simple four-period setting. Figure 1
provides a graphical representation.
Figure 1Four-period intergenerational transfer program
There are two non-overlapping generations, current and future. The current generation chooses
pollution abatement level A in the first period and decides on whether to incur the costs of
technology-enabling investments (TEI) in period 2 (I = 1) or not (I = 0).1 The TEI involve
technological as well as regulatory and institutional costs that allow the future generation to use
the backstop technology. The future generation decides whether to deploy the backstop in period 4
to undo the damages T from the unabated pollution stock. If it deploys the backstop (D = 1) , the
future generation avoids pollution damages, but incurs other environmental damages G associated
with the backstop. If it does not (D = 0), it suffers damages T . Between these decisions, in period
3, nature resolves the scientific uncertainty regarding the parameter λ that determines the marginal
damages of the pollution stock.
For simplicity and to make the model specific from the start, consider climate change as an
example of the stock pollution problem and some form of ‘geoengineering’ (Barrett 2008) as the im-
perfect backstop. Like much of the stock pollution literature, stock-related damages T are quadratic
in pollution. In period 4 damages caused by increased temperatures are of the form
T = λ2 (R0 −A)2 , (1)
capturing the convex impact of the amount of the stock pollutant net of abatement efforts (R0 −A)
1The sequentiality of the decisions on A and I is purely for ease of presention. A simultaneous choice of A and I
leads to identical results.
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and of the carbon sensitivity of the climate to a doubling of CO2, λ (Moreno-Cruz and Keith 2009).
The scientific uncertainty over the severity of the stock pollution problem then takes the form of
uncertainty about the carbon sensitivity. This is modeled as a random variable that is Bernoulli
distributed and takes a responsive value of λr > 0 with probability p and an unresponsive value of
0 < λu < λr with probability (1− p). As expression (1) makes clear, abatement is productive as
it reduces the expected value of pollution damages associated with climate change. Along with all
moves {A, I}, the pollution damage function (1) is common knowledge.
Again, in line with the literature, abatement costs are convex in abatement efforts. As a simple
approximation, the abatement cost function is of the quadratic type
X = αA2, (2)
with increasing marginal abatement cost 2αA. For a fixed sum of TEI, K, investment I in period 2
activates the backstop technology that fully neutralizes pollution damages, such that T = 0 if the
backstop is deployed. The cost of no TEI (I = 0) is zero.
The implementation of the backstop technology causes collateral damages by having unintended
net negative impacts. In the case of a climate change backstop such as stratospheric aerosol dis-
persal, typical changes are the alterations of precipitation patterns and increases in air pollution.
Assume, in line with Moreno-Cruz and Keith (2009), that the altruistic current generation values
these collateral damages G according to
G = ρ (R0 −A) (3)
which details an essentially linear relationship between damages and the magnitude of additional
stock of pollutants (R0 −A) that needs to be offset by the backstop, evaluated at constant marginal
value ρ.
Preference asymmetry enters into the model in the form of the successor generation diverging
from the current generation in terms of its valuation of collateral damages: From its vantage point,
damages are G̃ = θρ (R0 −A), with the asymmetry parameter θ > 1 indicating stronger environ-
mental preferences and θ < 1 weaker preferences than the current generation. In reality, θ will be
uncertain, but to make the results stark, we assume initially that the current generation believes it
knows θ before studying uncertainty in section 5. The assumption is productive for characterizing
the strategic conflicts, but it is also less radical if one accepts that the current generation has reasons
to think that it broadly understands the processes that determine the formation of the relevant so-
cial preferences vis-a-vis the environment.2 Clearly, the preference asymmetry parameter captures
2One could readily think of theories that endogenize θ as a function of the pollution stock (R0 −A), the state of
the environment λ2 (R0 −A)2, the state of technology I, or a combination thereof. The exogenous variant here is a
simplifying case.
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a significant number of possible hypotheses about the presence and direction of a preference shift
from generation to generation. The literature on technology, environment, and values (Barbour
1980) provides a rich set of narratives, some predicated on cognitive mechanisms, some on political
economy (see the exchange of arguments between Mesthene (1968) and McDermott (1969)). Inci-
dentally, a completely different, but equally valid explanation for preference asymmetry arise out of
the presence of hyperbolic discounting: Even generations with identical preferences will come to a
different assessment of damages because the difference in the time horizon between long-term stock
pollution damages and short-term collateral damages of using a backstop. While the long-term
effects would be evaluated by the current generation using a relatively lower discount rate, the
negative impacts of the backstop would be evaluated by the future generation using higher relative
discounting. This provides an alternative mechanism supporting the modeling assumptions. We
begin our analysis by assuming θ is known by the current generation. We discuss the effects of
explicitly considering uncertainty over the preference parameter θ in the last section of the paper.
2.2 Objectives and equilibrium concept
Turning to the objective functions, payoffs, and strategies of both generations, we start with the
future generation. Its objective is to minimize the sum of pollution damages and collateral damages
from using the backstop, taking the choices of the current generation, A and I, and the realization
of λ as given. The future generation’s strategy set is reduced to a simple choice regarding the
deployment of the backstop, i.e. D ∈ {0, 1}. Formally, the future generation’s problem is
min
{D}
λ2 (R0 −A)2 (1−D) + θρ (R0 −A)D, (4)
capturing the essential choice by the future generation between climate change damages and geo-
engineering damages.
The current generation’s problem is to optimally choose a strategy consisting of A in period
1 and I in period 2. In doing so, it aims to minimize expected total cost to itself (in the form
of abatement A and TEI I) and the future generation (in the form of damages). The current
generation takes decisions under uncertainty regarding the true value of λ and in anticipation of




αA2 + IK + E
[
λ2 (R0 −A)2 (1−D(λ, θ)) + ρ (R0 −A)D(λ, θ)
]
. (5)
The objective function (5) captures - along the lines of Pollak (1988) - the two concurrent motives
underpinning the current generation’s decision. One is strong altruism: The damages suffered by the
future generation enter into the current generation’s decision undiscounted. This strong altruism
7
ensures that the current generation does consider intergenerational transfers in kind (abatement
A) and in technologies (TEI effort I) to offset damages from pollution. The concurrent motive to
altruism is a form of paternalism: The damages suffered by the future generation enter into the
current generation’s decision without adjusting for the preference asymmetry θ. The formulation in
(5) shares with Cox (1987) an element of non-market service provision by the successor generation
(here in the form of selective deployment D), but the spirit that the current generation’s altruism
is tempered by notions of merit behavior is closer to Pollak (1988): The current generation has
most to gain from the successor generation behaving as the current generation would in the same
circumstances given by A, I, and λ. Specifically, this means deploying the imperfect backstop
only if the current generation would also do so. In the present example, this provides the current
generation with a reason for thinking strategically about whether to pass on a geoengineering
capability to the future generation or not.
The model set-up and objectives define a sequential game with incomplete information. Its basic
structure, in particular the technology transfer decision, is a variant of the trust game by Kreps
(1990). However, the intergenerational decision problem here features two important differences:
One is the availability of the second instrument in the form of abatement, the other the presence
of exogenous uncertainty in the form of the random variable λ. The proper solution concept for
determining the equilibrium played by the current and future generations is that of sub-game
perfection (SP). The current generation, looking forward, employs backward induction to solve
problem 5: By determining the optimal play of future generation (D∗|A, I, λ) in period 4 contingent
on current generation’s choices in periods 1 and 2 and nature’s move in period 3, it identifies its
own optimal play {A∗, I∗} in periods 1 and 2. However, it has to do so not knowing λ and D. The
SP equilibrium characterizes the expected welfare position of both generations.
2.3 Sum-up
The model is designed to capture - as parsimoniously as possible - a setting in which the inter-
generational decision problem of whether to provide a future generation with different preferences
with an imperfect backstop to solve a stock pollution problem can be productively discussed. The
four-period model intentionally accentuates the strict sequentiality as well as the intertemporal
structure of costs and benefits between current and future generation: The current generation sac-
rifices current consumption in favor of costly abatement activities and costly TEI, the benefits of
which accrue to the future generation. The future generation, on the other hand, is forced to accept
the carbon stock and the technologies handed down from the current generation, but benefits from
the fact that the scientific uncertainty regarding the pollution problem has been resolved.
It is useful to re-emphasize two unusual features of the model: One is that in contrast to much
of the intergenerational literature, the transfers here are not inter vivos. Once the the pollution and
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innovation choice have been made, the current generation has no further means of ensuring that
the next generation “will be doing the right thing”. The second is the presence of intergenerational
technology transfer and that its use by the successor generation has a merit dimension: Depending
on the circumstances, there is a course of action by the future generation that minimizes costs for
the current generation, but may not be in the interest of its successors. These modeling features
jointly determine the presence of a strategic conflict between the current and future generation.
3 Strategic equilibria
In the following, we first establish the existence and characterize the specific nature of the strategic
conflict between the current and future generation. As in Lindbeck and Weibull (1988), the strategic
conflict manifests itself as an incidence of time inconsistency. Specifically, we focus on the parameter
space for which the strategy profile that maximizes the current generation’s payoff is not subgame
perfect. Starting from a benchmark in which the strategy maximizing the current generation’s payoff
is time inconsistent, we then study the subgame perfect equilibria of the game and characterize the
strategic distortions that these equilibria imply.
3.1 Time inconsistency: Existence and characterization
Time inconsistency arises when the future generation deviates from the current generation’s pre-
ferred play. Deviation requires choice. In the intergenerational decision problem, the later gener-
ation has a choice if and only if the current generation decides to incur the TEI and develops the
backstop (I = 1). Otherwise, D = 0 by definition.3 The search for instances of time inconsistency
can therefore be restricted to sequences of play in which the current generation opts for TEI in
period two, i.e. chooses I = 1. TEI is rational only if the current generation’s expected payoff can
increase on account of the backstop being available in the final period. This implies meaningful
restrictions on the parameters of the model: In environmental terms, a necessary condition for
the backstop to generate net benefits is that ρ < λ2uR0. Otherwise, collateral damages rule out
deploying the backstop even in a world in which no abatement takes place (A = 0). In economic
terms, a necessary condition is that ρ < 2αR0. Otherwise, the marginal cost of even the last unit
of abatement is lower than the marginal damage of the backstop, implying that the backstop is
never a competitive substitute for abatement. Both restrictions define necessary conditions for the
existence of time inconcistency.
The necessary conditions can be refined further: The existence of time inconsistency requires
not only that the backstop is developed by the current generation (I = 1), but also that there
is an associated abatement level AC such that (5) is maximized. Given appropriate parameters
3It could be possible that the future generation could have available a CE technology that could deploy even if
TEI were absent. Although this question is of interest, we are not concerned here with that possibility.
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(see appendix), it is easy to show that this current welfare-maximizing transfer of abatement AC
and of the geoengineering technology is predicated on a rule of discriminate use of the backstop.
Specifically, it requires that D = 0 if λ = λu and D = 1 if λ = λr: Under this rule, the deployment
of the backstop is reserved for those circumstances in which the damage by the pollution stock is
revealed to be high. This captures the basic idea that the backstop technology serves as a fallback
option for the future generation for the case of a deleterious carbon sensitivity. Discriminate use,
however, is only subgame perfect if the future generation finds it rational to follow the rule once
the game arives at its decision node. Two cases can be distinguished and characterized.
Case 1 (Backstop Abuse) Given (4), the future generation finds it beneficial to deviate from the
stipulated rule, choosing D = 1 for any λ if
θρ < λ2u (R0 −AC) . (6)
This is the case of indiscriminate use of the backstop by the future generation despite the discrimi-
nate spirit in which it was developed by its predecessor. Specifically, the future generation chooses
to deploy the dirty backstop even if the realization of the pollution damage parameter is low. A
necessary condition for this subgame imperfection to arise is that θ < 1, i.e. the future generation
cares less about environmental damages from the geoengineering backstop than the current one.
Together with the above restrictions, (6) defines the feasible set of parameters for which backstop
misuse arises.
Case 2 (Backstop Abandonment) Given (4), the future generation finds it beneficial to deviate
from the stipulated rule, choosing D = 0 for any λ if
θρ > λ2r (R0 −AC) . (7)
This is the case of indiscriminate abandonment of the backstop by the future generation. Even if the
damage parameter associated with the pollution stock is high, the future generation does not avail
itself of the technological capability provided - at a cost - by its predecessor. A necessary condition
for this case of subgame imperfection is that θ > 1, i.e. the future generation cares more about the
negative collateral effects of using the dirty backstop than the current generation. Together with the
above restrictions, (7) defines the feasible set of parameters for which backstop abandonment arises.
In both cases, the current generation’s preferred strategy is not implementable and the welfare
optimum cannot be attained due to a deviation by the future generation. The deviation exists
because the current generation delivers a technological capability that is under the exclusive control
of its successor, deciding under a different set of preferences. This establishes the existence and
nature of the intergenerational conflict.
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3.2 Subgame-perfect equilibria
In order to study the time-consistent equilibria of the intergenerational game, it is useful to fix a
benchmark to highlight the distortional effect of strategic behavior. As in Lindbeck and Weibull
(1988), the benchmark maximizes the combined welfare of both generations. In addition, the
benchmark achieves this maximum through a combination of TEI (I = 1) and abatement AC
that replicates the discriminate strategy. The heuristic benefit is that deviations from I = 1 and
AC have meaningful interpretations as measures of the distortionary effects induced by preference
asymmetry.
The benchmark with the desired properties arises by setting the parameters K and ρ as follows:







u + 4pR0αρc − p2ρ2












and ρ̄ is the minimum of the economical and environmental







When ρ and K are restricted to values satisfying equations (8) and (9), there is an initial abate-
ment level AC =
2(1−p)R0λ2u+pρ
2(α+(1−p)λ2u)
that solves the problem in (5) and that generates the highest
combined welfare of both generations (see appendix). This initial abatement level maximizes
joint welfare if the play by the current and future generation is (AC , I = 1, λ = λr, D = 1) and
(AC , I = 1, λ = λu, D = 0). With the benchmark established, we study the strategic equilibria that
arise. We start with the Backstop Abuse case; that is, when the future generation is less concerned
with the impacts of the backstop.
3.2.1 Strategic equilibria under Backstop Abuse (θ < 1)
In this section we derive the three sub-game perfect equilibria between current and future generation
that can arise in response to backstop abuse: In the first equilibrium, the current generation
responds to the indiscriminate use of the backstop by reducing its level of abatement in order
to minimize current costs. We refer to this equilibrium as the underabatement case. A second
possibility arises if, considering the unconditional use of the backstop, the current generation finds
it optimal to commit to not providing the technology to the future generation. We refer to this
equilibrium as the technology denial case. In the third equilibrium, the current generation induces
discriminate use by the future generation by increasing the optimal level of abatement, and in
this way restricting the use of the dirty backstop to the case of an unfavorable state of the world.
We refer to this equilibrium as the overabatement case. The equilibrium that arises depends on
parameters of the model. We show in the next section the parameter constellation for which the
technology denial dominates the underabatement case and the overabatement case dominates the
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technology denial.
The Underabatement Equilibrium From (6) it is clear that for backstop abuse to occur, the
level of abatement by the current generation must be smaller than some critical level Acrit = R0− θρλ2u .
For A < Acrit, the future generation will deploy the backstop indiscriminately, while for A > Acrit,
the future generation will use the backstop, at most, in the deleterious state of the world where
λ = λr. Now consider the case that I = 1 and AC =
2(1−p)R0λ2u+pρ
2(α+(1−p)λ2u)
< Acrit. This is equivalent to a




≡ θ̄ < 1. (10)
If condition (10) is met, then a current generation that develops the backstop (I = 1) prefers
reducing its abatement level to AU =
ρ
2α over shouldering the relatively high abatement level
AC , which is only optimal given that conditional use will take place. The subscript U refers to
unconditional use of the backstop and reports the level of abatement that minimizes the problem
in (5) when the choice of the future generation is D = 1 for all λ. The intuition behind this result
is that in the face of a future generation offsetting stock pollution damages through the backstop
in any state of the world, it is optimal for the current generation to reduce the level of abatement
and save abatement costs. This strategy is subgame-perfect: Once abatement is reduced to AU ,
the dirty backstop will be used independently of the climate sensitivity outcome.
The Technology Denial Equilibrium As the underabatement equilibrium demonstrates, given
the right set of parameters, a rational decision-maker will decide to switch to a low abatement in
stage 1 to counter the time inconsistency of technology use policies. However, one part of the current
generation’s strategy in the underabatement equilibrium is that it undertakes technology transfer.
This transfer need not be optimal: A denial of technology may leave the current generation better
off.
If current society commits to I = 0, then the level of abatement that minimizes the costs of
the current generation is given by AB =
R0E[λ2]
α+E[λ2] . In this case, the current generation incurs higher
abatement costs since its concern for future welfare require a compensation in abatement terms to
a future generation deprived of the possibility of a backstop. The natural problem with this course
of action is that in the case of an unfavorable state of the world (a carbon-sensitive climate), the
future generation is left without the technological fallback option.
We show in the appendix that the constellation of parameters that supports the possibility of
technology denial is given by a lower bound on the cost of enabling the backstop technology K such
that:








That is, if the cost of TEI is large enough, the current generation decides to preclude strategically
the use of the backstop and to impose instead pollution stock damages consistent with its level of
abatement AB on the future generation. This strategy by the current generation is subgame-
perfect in a degenerate sense: By not developing the technology, the future generation is denied the
opportunity of deviation from equilibrium play.
The Overabatement Equilibrium The third equilibrium is closely related to the underabate-
ment equilibrium in that the current generation decides to provide the technology and adjusts its
abatement level strategically. As before, then I = 1 and AC =
2(1−p)R0λ2u+pρ
2(α+(1−p)λ2u)
< Acrit. In the third
equilibrium, however, the current generation’s play is to increase the level of abatement to a level
above Acrit and, hence, above AC . As the appendix shows, this equilibrium requires as a necessary
condition a lower bound on θ such that
θ ∈ [θ, θ̄] (12)








The intuition underpinning the overabatement equilibrium is that in order to induce the desired
discriminate behavior in the future generation, the current generation needs to increase abatement
beyond the cost-minimizing level such that the criterion (6) is not triggered. This increase in
abatement transfers rents to the future generation in order to compensate it for the stock pollution
damages if the state of the world turns out to be favorable and the backstop is not used. Condition
(12) ensures that this subgame-perfect strategy leaves the current generation still better off relative
to the indiscriminate use.
3.2.2 Strategic equilibria under Backstop Abandonment (θ > 1)
Building on the intuition developed in the previous section, we now turn to the strategic equilibria
that arise when θ > 1. In this case the current generation’s preferred course of action is to develop
the technology in order to provide its successor with a fallback option; however, it also knows
that the future generation will fail to use it given the stock pollution damages associated with the
welfare-maximizing strategy. In the example of climate change and a geoengineering option, the
future generation decides to suffer the climate change damages even in a highly carbon-sensitive
world rather than using the backstop of stratospheric aerosol dispersion.
In this section we derive the two subgame perfect equilibria that can arise in response to backstop
abandonment: One is the technology denial equilibrium, equivalent to that under the backstop
abuse case. The second is an underabatement equilibrium that returns the future generation to a
discriminate deployment regime.
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Technology Denial Equilibrium Incurring the cost of TEI is wasteful for the current generation
if the backstop will not be used under any circumstances, i.e. if D(λ = λr) = D(λ = λu) = 0.
From (7) it is clear that for backstop abandonment to occur, the level of abatement by the current
generation must be larger than some critical level A∗crit = R0 −
θρ
λ2r
. A sufficient condition for this
distortion to emerge at the initial abatement level AC is hence given by
θ >
λ2r (2αR0 − pρ)
2 (α+ (1− p)λ2u) ρ
≡ θ∗ > 1 (13)
If (13) holds, the current generation denies the future generation the technology. It is substantially
costly to induce the future generation to behave consistently with the benchmark case of discrim-
inate use. As under the θ < 1 case, this solution is subgame perfect in a degenerate way. The
difference is, however, that the reason here is not prevent the deployment of the dirty backstop,
but is simple cost-saving.
Underabatement Equilibrium Technology denial resolves the subgame imperfection of the
welfare-maximizing strategy {AC , I = 1}, but is not necessarily optimal. Instead, the current gen-
eration may prefer to provide the technological option to the future and combine the technology
transfer with a strategic inducement for deployment. The use of the backstop can be triggered if
abatement levels are reduced. Technically this results in a condition













Given (14), the current generation chooses abatement of magnitude AD at most equal to A
∗
crit =
R0− θρλ2r < AC such that the future generation chooses D = 1 whenever λ = λr. In other words, the
backstop technology is deployed when the state of the world is unfavorable. The subgame-perfection
is accomplished by imposing more pollution stock on the successor generation such that deployment
becomes preferred over accepting pollution damages.
4 The full characterization
4.1 Uniqueness
Two obvious questions follow from demonstrating the existence of the benchmark, the overabate-
ment, the underabatement, and the technology denial equilibrium. What parameter combinations
give rise to the different equilibria? And are these equilibria unique given parameter settings. In
this section, we provide a characterization of the intergenerational technology transfer game that
answers these questions.
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Figure 2 provides a graphical rendering of this characterization. Outcomes are determined in
K-θ space. K are the fixed costs of TEI for the current generation and θ is the degree of asymmetry
of preferences between the two generations. Conditions (8) and (9) hold such that the benchmark
case of discriminate use is welfare-maximizing and such that K and θ fully determine the decision
on the level of abatement.
Figure 2Parameter Space
The first insight that Figure 2 captures is that for a number of parameter constellations, the
benchmark strategy is implementable since it is subgame-perfect. On the one hand, the implemen-
tation of the current generation’s optimal policy is ensured if the costs of TEI are high, K > K̄:
The current generation will not incur the fixed cost of developing the backstop. Trivially, then,
I = 0 and the current generation does not deliver the technology to the future generation. The
current decision-maker therefore faces the simpler problem of determining optimal abatement only.
The outcome here is to choose an abatement level AB , that coincides with that under TEI denial.
On the other hand, the implementation of the current generation’s optimal policy is ensured if the
preference asymmetry falls within θ∗ > θ > θ̄. In such a world, current and future generation differ
in their valuation of backstop-induced damages, but not sufficiently to make the future generation
deviate from the first-best policy (AC , I = 1, λ = λr, D = 1) and (AC , I = 1, λ = λu, D = 0).
The second insight from Figure 2 is that for any parameter combination (K, θ), the subgame-
perfect equilibrium is unique. In other words, the benchmark, the overabatement, the under-
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in the lower portion of Figure 2 contains the strategic equilibria under the backstop




× [θ∗,∞) in the upper portion contains the strategic equilibria
under the backstop abandonment.
Starting with the lower portion, region U contains the combinations leading to the under-
abatement equilibrium in response to time inconsistency. Region B contains those leading to the
technology denial equilibrium. Region C contains combinations that give rise to the overabatement
equilibrium. The borders separating the regions have intuitive explanations. The boundary be-
tween regions B and U is given by K and does not depend on θ. The reason is that the abatement
levels in B and U , AB and AU , respectively, do not depend on θ. As a result, only variations in K
determine the choice between the underabatement and technology denial equilibria. The boundary
separating regions U and C is given by θ and does not depend on K. The reason is that in both
the overabatement and the underabatement equilibrium the technology is provided at the same
cost. The absolute level of K is therefore irrelevant for the relative welfare position associated with
the two equilibria. The boundary between regions C and B, on the other hand, is more involved:
Whether the current generation prefers overabatement to technology denial depends on













Observe that K̂ ′(θ) > 0 if θ < θ̄ and K̂ ′′(θ) < 0. Moreover, K̂(θ̄) = K̄ and K̂(θ) = K. This traces
out a boundary θ̂(K) in K-θ space. For values of K between K and K̄, the current generation’s
decision depends nontrivially on the degree of preference asymmetry θ. The abatement level in
region C is determined by Acrit, which decreases linearly in θ, leading to the costs of overabatement
decreasing more than linearly in θ. As a result, a decision-maker previously indifferent between the
overabatement and the technology denial equilibrium will accept more than proportionately higher
costs of the technology to remain indifferent between the equilibria as θ approaches θ̄ rather than
switching to overabatement.
The upper portion of Figure 2 contains the underabatement equilibrium in region H and the
technology denial equilibrium in region D. The lower bound on the upper portion given by θ∗
is intuitive as it defines the region where the benchmark strategy fails subgame-perfection. The
boundary between regions H and D is given by the condition
K < K̂∗(θ) (16)
where K̂∗(θ) is defined in (14). This traces out a function θ̂(K) in K-θ space, with a threshold
point at θ
∗
and a minimum at θ = θ∗. Between θ
∗
and θ∗, the boundary is decreasing in θ in an
intuitive way: Abatement levels in region H are determined by A∗crit, which decreases linearly in θ,
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leading to the costs of underabatement decreasing more than linearly. As a result, a decision-maker
previously indifferent between the underabatement and technology denial equilibrium will accept
more than proportionately higher costs of the backstop to remain indifferent between the equilibria
as θ approaches θ∗ rather than switching to underabatement.
5 Uncertainty over future preferences
The assumption that the current generation believes to know the future generation’s preference
parameter θ with certainty provides an instructive starting point. A more general approach is to
assume that the current generation regards future preferences as random and assigns a probability
density function f (θ) to different possible realizations of θ. The objective function and the decision
problem of the current generation (5) then remain formally unchanged, but the expectation operator
now includes expectations over both climate sensitivity λ and future preferences θ. As a result,
when deciding on abatement A and TEI I, the current generation needs to take into account the
consequences of its choice {A, I} on its welfare under all possible realizations of θ and λ. We
first undertake an analytical characterization at the general level, followed by a specific numerical
illustration for a set of parameters and probability functions.
5.1 Analytical characterization
To determine the current generation’s optimal decision on TEI, it is sufficient to compare outcomes
under technology provision (I = 1) with the outcome under technology denial (I = 0) under a
probability function f : [0,∞) → R, restricted to allow only positive willingness to pay to avoid







E[λ2](R0 −A)2f(θ)dθ . (17)
The integrand does not depend on θ, hence the abatement level AB , familiar from the case under
certainty, is the minimizer. The fixed benefit level under I = 0 provides the benchmark for the
maximal benefit level attainable for an optimal choice of A given that I = 1.
With I = 1, the objective function is
min
{A}











E[λ2](R0 −A)2f(θ)dθ . (18)






crit(A),∞) over which the expression is evaluated. These three intervals
represent the three distinct use regimes of the backstop, depending on the specific realization of θ.
The critical levels θcrit(A) and θ
∗
crit(A) determine, for a given level A, the threshold at which an
increase in θ leads to a change from indiscriminate to discriminate use (θcrit(A)) and a change from








and therefore depend negatively on A. Figure 3 provides a graphical rendering of the use regimes
and thresholds in A-θ space.
Figure 3: A-θ-space
Determining the optimal abatement level A for I = 1 and comparing the resulting benefits
with that under technology denial {AB , I = 0} is a numerical exercise to which we turn - with
specific examples of probability distributions - in the next section. Here, we complete the analytical
characterization by exploiting the nature of the intervals and the specific form of expression (18)
to make some general statements on how increases in the variance of the probability distribution,
σ, impact on the TEI decision and the optimal abatement level. All distributions of θ we use have
mean 1 in order to model an unbiased ex ante belief about future generation, while the variance σ
is a measure how uncertain we are about their attitude towards the technology.
The first observation is that increases in σ that preserve the mean of 1 unambiguously decrease
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the benefits generated by technology provision. With three intervals [0, θcrit(A)], [θcrit(A), θ
∗
crit(A)]
and [θ∗crit(A),∞) and a welfare maximizing benchmark in the interval [θcrit(A), θ∗crit(A)], increases
in variance imply a redistribution of mass in the probability distribution from that interval to the
outlying intervals [0, θcrit(A)] and [θ
∗
crit(A),∞). Note that each of the three definite integrals is
minimized by a different abatement level, thus making it hard to choose one distinct A. As this
range of desired abatement levels even increases with θ such a redistribution invariably leads to a
choice of A that in expected terms provides less welfare than a choice under a lower σ.
The second observation is that since the benefits of a technology denial policy {AB , I = 0}
are fixed and independent of σ, an increase in σ renders technology denial (I = 0) relatively more
beneficial than technology provision. The difference in benefits captures the quasi-option value that
would be associated with the opportunity to learn the realization of θ before committing to a TEI
and abatement policy. Given the fixed benchmark of technology denial, numerical implementations
will find that a policy {AB , I = 0} is preferred to technology provision as soon as σ reaches a critical
level. Together with the first observation, this means that optimal abatement levels under I = 1
can only deviate within bounds set by the outside option of I = 0. This third observation leads to
the prediction that numerical implementations will find narrow deviations in A from the optimum
in response to increases in σ.
The fourth and final observation is that the direction of deviations from the optimal level of A
can be explained by the nature of the strategic equilibria characterized in the previous section and
figure 2. Since the thresholds (19) are not equidistant from 1 unless A = R0− 2 ρ(λ2r+λ2u) , symmetric
changes in the shape of the distribution have asymmetric impacts on the optimal A: For example,
for |1− θcrit(A)| < |1− θ∗crit(A)| and for σ increasing from 0 to a positive value, the first region
of strategic distortion to receive positive mass in the distribution is region C. The positive weight
given to region C involves an abatement level Acrit that decreases with θ, leading to increases in
the optimal A the more probability is assigned to lower realizations of θ in this region. Further
increases in σ assign more mass to regions such as U and H, associated with lower levels of A. In
this specific case then, abatement will fall with these increases in σ, before rising again as region D
receives positive weight. Taken together, the fourth observation is that abatement levels can vary
non-monotonously with σ.
5.2 Numerical illustration
The specific examples we discuss here are the case of a Bernoulli distribution with θ = 1± σ with
equal probability and a Gamma distribution that is not symmetric around the mean. A parameter
set that fulfills all the conditions for the existence of the benchmark equilibrium is one with
p = 0.5 , R0 = 4 , λu = 2 , λr = 3 , α = 1 , ρ = 5 . (20)
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Applying the results of section 3 and 4, the critical levels for the strategic equilibria are then
K = 0.12 , K̄ = 0.39 , θ = 0.49 , θ̄ = 0.73 , θ∗ = 1.65 , θ̄∗ = 2.30 (21)
and the resultant abatement levels for the various strategic equilibria are
AC = 3.08 , AU = 2.50 , AB = 3.47 , Acrit =
16− 5 · θ
4
, A∗crit =
36− 5 · θ
4
. (22)
Starting with the case of a Bernoulli distribution with θ = 1 ± σ with equal probability, the
optimal abatement level as a function of the variance is given in figure 4.
Figure 4
Figure 4 confirms the intuition of our analytical discussion of expression (18): Abatement initally
remains unchanged at AC = 3.08 until region C has enough weight for the required increases in
A to change the optimal level of abatement. Then abatement increases in line with Acrit before
dropping off as more probability is shifted to regions characterized by underabatement equilibria.
The difference between current generation benefits under technology denial or provision is de-
picted in figure 5, which traces the net benefits of technology denial.
As figure 5 confirms, the gains from technology denial rise quickly as the variance increases.
This reflects the decrease in benefits associated with choosing an abatement level that commits
the current generation to a policy whatever the realization of θ are rather than accruing the fixed
benefits of the denial strategy.
To demonstrate that the general nature of the results also holds under a distribution that is
quite different, consider the optimal abatement level and the net benefits of technology denial for
the same parameters and a Gamma distribution with expected value 1 and variance σ. These are
given in figure 6 and 7, respectively.
Even a cursory inspection shows that the basic insights regarding the narrow range of variation





of technology denial as a function of variance also hold for a distribution with a distinct set of
characteristics.
The analytical and numerical discussion together emphasize three points: The first is that
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uncertainty over the future generation’s preferences raises the attractiveness of technology denial
since technology provision entails conditioning abatement levels to possible realizations of θ and
therefore deviating more and more from the benefit level attainable under certainty. By eradicating
preference uncertainty, the argument in favor of technology denial gets stronger the more uncertainty
is admitted. This adds an additional dimension to the small literature on optimal environmental
policy under preference uncertainty. The second point is that the optimal abatement level varies
only over a relatively small range for those levels of uncertainty under which the technology is
provided. The third is that the variations in abatement levels have an intuitive explanation based
on the strategic equilibria derived in section 4.
6 Concluding discussion
The starting point of this paper is that the impacts of long-lived stock pollutants and the abatement
and technology measures supposed to address them link current and future generations together.
Altruism towards successor generations is a prerequisite for resolving the resulting intergenerational
equity issues. Preference asymmetry and typical imperfections of altruism, however, introduce the
possibility of important strategic conflicts between generations. The presence and nature of these
conflicts and the strategic distortions thus introduced are the subject of this inquiry.
The paper’s result, derived in a stark setting, demonstrate that preference asymmetry and im-
perfect altruism raise the possibility of a rich set of outcomes in this type of intergenerational
transfer game. The future generation may be deliberately denied an imperfect backstop, either
because of a perception by the current generation that the technology will be used indiscriminately
or not at all. The current generation may also decide that it is rational to accompany the devel-
opment of the backstop with a reduction in abatement efforts, either because it believes that with
the backstop being used regardless of the level of damages, abatement is not productive or because
it needs to ‘turn up the heat’ on a more cautious successor generation for it to choose to ‘enjoy’
the benefits of technology. Finally, comparing abatement levels under certainty and uncertainty,
the current generation will prefer to avoid a costly smoothing of abatement levels across different
realizations of the future generation’s preferences once the variance is significant by simply reverting
to the safe option of technology denial.
The paper’s assumptions are stark, but we believe that they are productive for capturing some-
thing salient about the problem of intergenerational technology transfer. The rich set of outcomes
not only provides a full characterization of this parsimonious setting, it also highlight a few coun-
terintuitive and troubling findings. For example, a future generation known to have stronger en-
vironmental preferences may be left with a higher stock of pollution for strategic reasons in order
to induce use of the backstop. What the results highlight then is that the natural coexistence
of intergenerational altruism with a notion of proper use of the technological capabilities gener-
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ates rather striking results. Also, while the idea of a technology denial and of an underabatement
equilibrium have been raised outside economics when discussing problematic backstops to climate
change such as geoengineering solutions (Royal Society 2009, U.S. National Academy of Sciences
2009), the equilibria established in this paper add a novel possibility: This is the presence of an
overabatement equilibrium in a world in which the future generation is believed to be less concerned
about the environment. Finally, uncertainty provides additional powerful arguments for leaving a
future generation to suffer stock pollution damages by denying the available backstop technology. In
sum, the paper illustrates that while altruism is a sine-qua-non for resolving the long-term environ-
mental problems that are at the basis of intergenerational conflicts, differences in preferences and
the paternalistic dimension inherent in much of altruistic behavior raise the possibility of strategic
dimensions so far unconsidered.
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A Objectives and Abatement levels
We differentiate between three combinations of I and D and look at the associate objective function
(equation (4)) of current generation:
Calways = αA
2 + pρ(R0 −A) + (1− p)λ2u(R0 −A)2 +K (A.1)
if I = 1 and D(λ = λu) = 1, D(λ = λr) = 1
Ccond = αA
2 + ρ(R0 −A) +K (A.2)
if I = 1 and D(λ = λu) = 0, D(λ = λr) = 1
CnoCE = αA
2 + (pλ2r + (1− p)λ2u) · (R0 −A)2 (A.3)
if I = 0 .
The optimal level of abatement can be derived by means of FOC
dCalways
dA






(AC) = 0 ⇒ AC =
2(1− p)R0λ2u + pρ








These are minimizers because
d2Calways
dA2
= 2α > 0 ,
d2Ccond
dA2







> 0 . (A.7)
It is useful to have the values of the objective functions at the minimizers at hand:
















There is a level of abatement which separates de facto always use from de facto conditional use.
To calculate this critical level Acrit we note that future generation will prefer indiscriminate use to
conditional use iff damages by CE in the unresponsive case are smaller than temperature damages,
i.e.
θρ(R0 −A) < λ2u(R0 −A)2 ⇔ A < R0 −
θρ
λ2u
≡ Acrit . (A.11)
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Similar, we find an abatement level that separates conditional use and renunciation of the CE-
option. The latter will be the case for all
A > R0 −
θρ
λ2r
≡ A∗crit . (A.12)
It is obvious that A∗crit > Acrit.























The abatement level AC is by definition optimal given that conditional use of CE will be reality.
For this combination (AC ,conditional use) to be preferred over unconditional use and banning R&D
two conditions must hold
Ccond(AC) < Calways(A) ∀A (Start1)
Ccond(AC) < CnoCE(A) ∀A (Start2)
We analyze both conditions separately
(Start1) is, by definition of AU (cf. A.4), equivalent to Ccond(AC) < Calways(AU ). Using (A.8) and



















and since the quadratic function is larger 0 at ρ = 0 we see
that (Start1) is equivalent to ρ ∈ (ρ1, ρ2). But it is straightforward to show that ρ2 is larger





is the relevant c! on-
dition.
(Start2) is, by definition of AB (cf. A.6), equivalent to Ccond(AC) < CnoCE(AB). By making use of












As we do not allow for negative costs of enabling the technology, K ≥ 0, we get an extra



















Making use of ρ ≥ 0, the fact that (B.1) holds for ρ = 0 and that the smaller root is positive shows











≡ ρtechnical . (B.2)










α2 + α(1− p)λ2u
α(1 + p) + λ2u





















Condition (8)[use the right label/ref here] is easy to replicate: Use (A.5) and (A.11) to rearrange
AC < Acrit.
Remark 3 It is not always true that switching to AU is a reduction of abatement




Note that whether the last condition is always fulfilled (since ρtechnical < 2αR0
λ2u
α+λ2u
) or this anomaly
might take place depends on the parameters. As it is not essential for our results we do not determine
the relevant parameter constellations here.
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Proof of the Lemma. (Start1) is in particular true for A = AC . Thus,
αA2C + pρ(R0 −AC) + (1− p)λ2u(R0 −AC)2 < αA2C + pρ(R0 −AC) + (1− p)ρ(R0 −AC)
⇒ λ2u(R0 −AC) < ρ
⇒ θ̄ < 1 .
Technology Denial
The condition for the technology denial to be preferred over the underabatement case is CnoCE(AB) <







The abatement level AB is larger than AC since simple algebra shows that AB > AC iff 1 <
λ2r(2αR0−pρ)
(α+(1−p)λ2u)ρ
= 2θ∗. As θ∗ > 1 (see Appendix D) the statement is proven.
Overabatement
There are two conditions that must hold for the Overabatement equilibrium to arise. Overabatement
has to be preferred over, firstly, Underabatement and, secondly, technology denial.
(i) We compare Calways(AU ) with Ccond at A = Acrit. If the latter is lower, such that conditional
use at Acrit is preferred to unconditional use at AU , by continuity an abatement level larger
than Acrit exists at which this is still true - and conditional use will be strictly preferred over
unconditional use.








< 0 . (C.2)













It is straightforward to show that θ1, θ2 > 0. Because the quadratic equation (C.2) is not
fulfilled at θ = 0 condition (C.2) is equivalent to θ ∈
(
θ̄ −∆, θ̄ + ∆
)
. Finally, because θ < θ̄
by (8) [again, find right ref here], it reads θ ∈ (θ, θ̄), where θ = θ̄ −∆.
Remark 4 Again, it is not a priori clear that Acrit > AU , i.e. overabatement deserving of
that appellation. We have Acrit > AU iff R0 − θρλ2u −
ρ
2α > 0. To get a sufficient condition we
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plug in θ̄ instead of θ. Some algebra yields




Note that this bound is also the one that decides whether AU < AC or not (cf. C.1).
(ii) The Overabatement is preferred over the technology denial iff Ccond(Acrit) < CnoCE(AB).

























< 0. Thus, a maximum of the





Finally, it is simply a lengthy calculation to show that K̂(θ̄) = K̄ and K̂(θ) = K.








, the inverse function







The possible outcome in this case is that future generation will prefer to never use the technology
while current generation wants it to be used conditionally. The initial equilibrium is subject to this






≡ θ∗ . (D.1)
Proof of the Lemma. (Start2) is in particular true for A = AC . Thus,
αA2C + pρ(R0 −AC) + (1− p)λ2u(R0 −AC)2 < αA2C + pλ2r(R0 −AC)2 + (1− p)λ2u(R0 −AC)2
⇒ ρ < λ2r(R0 −AC)
⇒ 1 < θ∗ .
Underabatement
The Underabatement is preferred over the technology denial if and only if Ccond(A
∗
crit) < CnoCE(AB)

























< 0. Thus, a maximum of the function





Finally, it is simply a lengthy calculation to show that K̂∗(θ∗) = K̄ .


















E Uncertainty over future preferences
To verify the expressions for θcrit and θ
∗
crit please cf. the Appendix A, where Acrit and A
∗
crit are
derived for given θ.
The Gamma Distribution is defined as
γ(x; k, ξ) := xk−1
exp(−x/ξ)
Γ(k)ξk
, x ≥ 0 , k, ξ > 0
where Γ is the gamma function. This distribution has the properties E[x] = kξ, Var[x] = kξ2. As








where σ = Var[θ].
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